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Abstract
In recent years, several protocols for password-based authenticated key exchange
have been proposed. These protocols aim to be secure even though the sample
space of passwords may be small enough to be enumerated by an off-line adversary.
In Eurocrypt 2000, Bellare, Pointcheval and Rogaway (BPR) presented a model and
security definition for authenticated key exchange. They claimed that in the ideal-
cipher model (random oracles), the two-flow protocol at the core of Encrypted Key
Exchange (EKE) is secure. Bellare and Rogaway suggested several instantiations of
the ideal cipher in their proposal to the IEEE P1363.2 working group. Since then
there has been an increased interest in proving the security of password-based pro-
tocols in the ideal-cipher model. For example, Bresson, Chevassut, and Pointcheval
have recently showed that the OEKE protocol is secure in the ideal cipher model.
In this paper, we present examples of real (NOT ideal) ciphers (including naive
implementations of the instantiations proposed to IEEE P1363.2) that would result
in broken instantiations of the idealized AuthA protocol and OEKE protocol. Our
result shows that the AuthA protocol can be instantiated in an insecure way, and
that there are no well defined (let alone rigorous) ways to distinguish between secure
and insecure instantiations. Thus, without a rigorous metric for ideal-ciphers, the
value of provable security in ideal cipher model is limited.
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1 Introduction
Numerous cryptographic protocols rely on passwords selected by users (peo-
ple) for strong authentication. Since the users find it inconvenient to remember
long passwords, they typically select short easily-rememberable passwords. In
these cases, the sample space of passwords may be small enough to be enumer-
ated by an adversary thereby making the protocols vulnerable to a dictionary
attack. It is desirable then to design password-based protocols that resist off-
line dictionary attacks.
The password-based protocol problem was first studied by Gong, Lomas, Need-
ham, and Saltzer [10] who used public-key encryption to guard against off-line
password-guessing attacks. In another very influential work [4], Bellovin and
Merritt introduced Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE), which became the ba-
sis for many of the subsequent works in this area. These protocols include
SPEKE [13] and SRP [25,26]. Other papers addressing the above protocol
problem can be found in [7,9,11,16]. Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway [2]
defined a model for the password-based protocol problem and claimed that
their model is rich enough to deal with password guessing, forward secrecy,
server compromise, and loss of session keys. Then they claimed that in the
ideal-cipher model (random oracles), the two-flow protocol at the core of En-
crypted Key-Exchange (EKE) is secure. In addition, Bellare and Rogaway
[3] suggested several instantiations (AuthA) of the ideal-cipher in their pro-
posal to the IEEE P1363.2 Working Group. Recently, Bresson, Chevassut, and
Pointcheval [8] proposed a simplified version of AuthA, which is called OEKE,
and showed that OEKE achieves provable security against dictionary attacks
in both the random oracle and ideal-cipher models under the computational
Diffie-Hellman intractability assumption.
The ideal-cipher model was introduced by Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway
[2] as follows. Fix finite sets of strings G and C where |G| = |C|. In the ideal-
cipher model, choosing a random function h from Ω amounts to giving the
protocol (and the adversary) a perfect way to encipher strings in G: namely,
for K ∈ {0, 1}∗, we set EK : G → C to be a random bijective function, and we
let DK : {0, 1}
∗ → G defined by DK(y) be the value x such that EK(x) = y, if
y ∈ C, and undefined otherwise.
This paper studies the security issues with practical realization of the ideal ci-
pher model by Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway [2]. We show that for several
instantiations of the ideal-cipher (including naive implementations of instan-
tiations suggested in [12]), the instantiated Bellare and Rogaway’s protocol
(AuthA) is not secure against off-line dictionary attacks. Our results show
that realizing the ideal-cipher of Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway can be
tricky. In particular, our results point out the weakness in the ideal-cipher
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methodology of Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway. That is, without a robust
measuring method for deciding whether a given cipher is a “good realiza-
tion” of the ideal-cipher, ideal-cipher model analysis [2,8] of a password-based
protocol can be of limited value. Indeed, there is no well defined (let alone
rigorous) way in [2] to distinguish between secure and insecure instantiations
of an ideal-cipher. Note that Black and Rogaway [5] have done some initial
research on the potential implementations of ideal-ciphers with arbitrary finite
domains. However, it is still far from a complete solution.
One of the main applications of password-based protocols is in the environ-
ment of wireless and other more constrained devices (e.g., secure downloading
of private credentials: SACRED [20]). Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
has been extensively used in these constrained devices. However, most of the
suggested password-based protocols are described in the group (or subgroup
of) G = Z∗p, and are either non-friendly or non-secure for ECC-based groups.
For example, SRP [25,26] is based on a field and used both field operations of
addition and multiplication, but ECC groups only have one group operation.
Several ECC-based SRP protocols have been introduced in Lee and Lee [14].
We will show that one of these protocols is completely insecure. We will also
discuss the security issues related ECC-based SRP protocols. As an example,
we will also present a variant SRP5 of the original SRP protocol.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we informally address
the security problems of password-based protocols. We mount attacks on sev-
eral instantiations of Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway’s AuthA protocol and
on instantiations of Bresson, Chevassut, and Pointcheval’s OEKE protocol in
Sections 3 and 4 respectively. In Section 5 we briefly discuss instantiations of
OEKE and the SRP protocol. We draw our conclusions in Section 6.
2 Security of password authentication
Halevi and Krawczyk [11, Sections 2.2-2.3] introduced a notion of security for
password authentication. They provide a list of basic attacks that a password-
based protocol needs to guard against. In the following, we provide the list
of attacks. An ideal password protocol should be secure against these attacks
and we will follow these criteria when we discuss the security of password
protocols.
• Eavesdropping. The attacker may observe the communications channel.
• Replay. The attacker records messages she has observed and re-sends them
at a later time.
• Man-in-the-middle. The attacker intercepts the messages sent between
the parties C and S and replaces these with her own messages. She plays
3
the role of the client in the messages which it sends to the server, and at
the same time plays the role of the server in the messages that she sends to
the client. A special man-in-the-middle attack is the small subgroup attack
[15,18,23]. We illustrate this kind of attack by a small example. Let g be a
generator of the group G of order n = qt for some small t > 1. In a standard
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, the client C chooses a random x and
sends gx to the server S, then S chooses a random y and sends gy to C.
The shared key between C and S is gxy. Now assume that the attacker A
intercepts C’s message gx, replaces it with gxq, and sends it to S. A also
intercepts S’s message gy, replaces it with gyq, and sends it to C. In the end,
both C and S compute the shared key gqxy. Since gqxy lies in the subgroup
of order t of the group generated by gq, it takes on one of only t possible
values. A can easily recover this gqxy by an exhaustive search.
• Impersonation. The attacker impersonates the client or the server to get
some useful information.
• Password-guessing. The attacker is assumed to have access to a relatively
small dictionary of words that likely includes the secret password α. In an
off-line attack, the attacker records past communications and searches for a
word in the dictionary that is consistent with the recorded communications.
In an on-line attack, the attacker repeatedly picks a password from the
dictionary and attempts to impersonate C or S. If the impersonation fails,
the attacker removes this password from the dictionary and tries again,
using a different password.
• Partition attack. The attacker records past communications, then goes
over the dictionary and deletes those words that are not consistent with
the recorded communications from the dictionary. After several tries, the
attacker’s dictionary could become very small.
We now informally sketch the definition of security in [11] for a password-
based protocol. The attacker A is allowed to watch regular runs of the protocol
between the client C and the server S, and can also actively communicate with
C and S in replay, impersonation, and man-in-the-middle attacks. A protocol
is said to be secure in the presence of such an attacker if (i) whenever the server
S accepts an authentication session with C, it is the case that C did indeed
participate in the authentication session; and (ii) C accepts an authentication
session with S, it is the case that S did indeed participate in the authentication
session.
3 Security issues with practical realizations of the ideal cipher
model: on Bellare and Rogaway’s AuthA
In the remainder of this paper, we will use the following notations: By G = 〈g〉,
we denote a cyclic group generated by g, and by ord(g), we denote the order
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of g. For a symmetric encryption scheme E and a key pi, Epi(x) denotes the
ciphertext of x. We also assume that the client C holds a password α and the
server S holds a key β which is a known function of α. In a protocol for a
symmetric model, the client and the server share the same password, that is,
β = α. In this paper, we will abuse our notation by letting C and S also denote
corresponding parties’ identification strings. In a protocol for an asymmetric
model, β will typically be chosen so that it is hard to compute α from C,
S, and β. The password α might be a poor one. Probably the user selects
some short easily-rememberable α and then installed β at the server. In the
protocols, H is used to denote a secure hash function. We will also abuse our
notation by using C (respectively, S) to denote the identity number of the
client (respectively, the server).
3.1 The AuthA protocol
Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway [2] defined a model for the password-based
protocol problem and showed that their model is rich enough to deal with
password guessing, forward secrecy, server compromise, and loss of session
keys. Then they proved that in the ideal-cipher model (random oracles), the
two-flow protocol at the core of Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) is secure. In
addition, Bellare and Rogaway [3] suggested several instantiations of the ideal-
cipher in their proposal to IEEE P1363.2 working group. In the protocol, the
server S stores the value 〈C, β〉 for each client C where β = gα. The protocol
proceeds as follows:
(1) C chooses a random x ∈ [1, ord(g)− 1], computes gx, encrypts it with β,
and sends the ciphertext Eβ(g
x) to the Server S.
(2) S chooses a random y ∈ [1, ord(g)− 1], computes gy, encrypts it with β,
and sends the ciphertext Eβ(g
y) to C.
(3) AuthA authentication steps. Let K = H(C||S||gx||gy||gxy). Then there
are three authentication methods for AuthA:
(a) The server authenticates himself by sending H(K||2) to C.
(b) The client authenticates himself by sending H(K||gαy) to S.
(c) Both server and client achieve mutual authentication by sending both
of the messages in the above two steps
The authors of [2] claimed that if the encryption function E is given by an
ideal-cipher (random oracle), then the first-two-step sub-protocol (of AuthA)
at the core of EKE is provably secure in their model. In the following sections,
we present examples of real (NOT ideal) ciphers (including two naive imple-
mentations of the three instantiations proposed to IEEE P1363.2) that would
result in broken instantiations of the idealized AuthA protocol. Indeed, in [2],
the authors warn that “incorrect instantiation of the encryption primitive,
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including instances which are quite acceptable in other contexts, can easily
destroy the protocol’s security”. Our examples confirm this argument.
3.2 Instantiation Eβ(X) = X · g
H(β)
Assume that H is a random oracle. Bellare and Rogaway [3] suggested the
instantiation Eβ(X) = X ·H(β) of the ideal-cipher. Obviously, this is far from
an ideal cipher. However, this misleading instantiation will give one impression
that Eβ(X) = X · g
H(β) could also be a “reasonable” instantiation of the ideal-
cipher. Indeed, one may wonder, if Eβ(X) = X · H(β) is an ideal cipher, why
Eβ(X) = X · g
H(β) is not? In the following, we will describe our attack on the
two-step protocol with this instantiation Eβ(X) = X · g
H(β).
No matter whether there is an authentication step (as in AuthA) or not, our
attack works for the two-step protocol. If there is an authentication step, then
the adversary A will launch impersonation attacks and use the authentication
messages to verify whether the guessed password is a correct one. Without loss
of generality, we assume that the server sends the first authentication message
if any authentication message is ever sent between C and S (if the first authen-
tication message is sent from client to server, then the following attack works
when the adversary impersonate the server). If there is no authentication step,
then the adversary could not check whether a guessed password is a correct
one. However, in practice, the established session key will be used either to
encrypt the actual data for the application protocol or to encrypt client’s pri-
vate credential (e.g., client’s private key). In either case, the adversary A can
verify whether the guessed password is a correct one by checking the redun-
dancy in these encrypted data. Specifically, consider the following scenario. A
impersonates the client, chooses a random z, and sends gz to the server. The
server S chooses a random y, sends gy+H(β) to A, and computes the shared
key K = H(C||S||gz−H(β)||gy||g(z−H(β))y). A distinguishes the following three
cases:
(1) This is an AuthA protocol and S sends H(K||2) to A for authentication.
For each guessed β ′, A computes
K ′ = H(C||S||gz−H(β
′)||gy+H(β)−H(β
′)||g(y+H(β)−H(β
′))(z−H(β′))).
Note that if β ′ = β, then K ′ = K and H(K||2) = H(K ′||2). Thus A can
decide whether β ′ is the correct password.
(2) S sends EK(m) to A, where m is some application data and has sufficient
redundancy. For each guessed β ′, A computes K ′ as in the above item 1
and decrypts EK(m) as m
′ = E−1K ′ (EK(m)). If β
′ = β, then K ′ = K and
m′ = m. Thus by checking the redundancy in m′, A can decide whether
she has guessed the password correctly.
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(3) S sends EK(pi) to A, where pi is C’s private key encrypted with C’s pass-
word α. Similarly, for each guessed α′, A first computes β ′, then com-
putes K ′ as in the above item 1 and decrypts EK(pi) as pi
′ = E−1K ′ (EK(pi)).
If β ′ = β, then K ′ = K and pi′ = pi. A further decrypts pi′ with α′ to see
whether the decrypted value is the private key of C. Since A knows C’s
public key, she can easily verify this fact. Thus, A can decide whether
she has guessed the password correctly.
The above attack demonstrates the inherent weakness in the “ideal-cipher
model methodology” by Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway [2]. That is, with-
out a robust measuring method for deciding whether a given cipher is a “good
realization”, ideal-cipher model analysis of a password-based protocol can be
of limited value. Indeed, there is no well defined (let alone rigorous) way in [2]
to distinguish between secure and insecure instantiations of an ideal-cipher.
3.3 Instantiation Eβ(X) = X · H(β)
The first ideal-cipher instantiation for AuthA in [3] is: Eβ(X) = X · H(β).
The authors suggested that the group G = 〈g〉 could be a group on which the
Diffie-Hellman problem is hard:
...This group could be G = Z∗p, or it could be a prime-order subgroup of this
group, or it could be an elliptic curve group...(from [2])
After the introduction of the instantiation function, the authors [3] commented
that “you apply the mask generation function H to β, interpret the result as a
group element, and multiply by the plaintext”. However, for most implemen-
tations, one may ignore this comment and just multiply the hash result with
the plaintext. Naively, one can also interpret the hash result H(β) as a group
element gH(β). Then our attacks in Section 3.2 show that this instantiation
is not secure. Indeed, from the ideal-cipher assumption, it is not clear that
one needs to interpret the hash result as a group element other than gH(β).
One may feel that both X · H(β) and X · gH(β) can be regarded as accept-
able instantiations of the ideal cipher over Z∗p (why not?). In the following, we
mount an off-line dictionary attack on this instantiation without interpreting
the result as a group element.
Our attack in Section 3.2 does not work for AuthA with this instantiation.
However, we can show that this instantiation will leak some information of
the password α if the group is a subgroup of Z∗p or an elliptic curve group. As
an example, we illustrate the information leakage of AuthA with a subgroup
of Z∗p. Assume that p = tq + 1 with gcd(t, q) = 1. In practice, generally one
chooses p = 2q + 1 for some large prime q (see, e.g., [17]), and ord(g) = q.
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In the attack, the eavesdropper A intercepts the message gx · H(β), computes
(H(β))q = (gx · H(β))q. For each guessed β ′, A checks whether (H(β ′))q =
(H(β))q. If the equation does not hold, then A deletes β ′ from her dictionary.
Since H is a random oracle, the value (H(x))q is uniformly distributed over
the set {gq1, g
2q
1 , . . . , g
tq
1 } when x is chosen at random, where g1 is a generator
of Z∗p. That is, Z
∗
p = 〈g1〉. Thus, log t bits information of the password is
leaked for each communication between the client and the server with different
Diffie-Hellman parameters. Thus, after ⌈ |α|
log t
⌉ observations of communications
between the client and the server with different Diffie-Hellman parameters,
the adversary will recover the password with high probability.
Despite the above attacks, we feel that AuthA could be securely instantiated
by the cipher: Eβ(X) = X · ı(H(β)), where H is a secure hash function and
where ı maps a random string to a group element of order ord(g) by “in-
creasing” the random string one by one until reaching a group element with
the above given property. This instantiation should work both for ECC based
groups and for subgroups of Z∗p. But we would like to warn that we have not
proved with reasonable assumptions that this is a secure instantiation of the
ideal cipher. Of course, it has been proven [2] that if Eβ(X) = X · ı(H(β)) is
an ideal cipher then the above instantiation is provable secure against off-line
dictionary attacks. But we have no mechanisms to measure whether the above
cipher is an ideal cipher.
3.4 Instantiation Eβ(X) = (r,X · H(r||β))
The second ideal-cipher instantiation for AuthA in [3] is: Eβ(X) = (r,X ·
H(r||β)), where r is independently chosen at random for each session. After
the introduction of this instantiation, the authors [3] did not mention that
the hash result H(r||β) should be interpreted as a group element before ap-
plying the multiplication. However we assume that the authors have this in
mind when they introduce this instantiation. But this again shows that a
naive implementation may multiply the hashing result with X directly with-
out interpreting it as a group element since Eβ(X) = (r,X · H(r||β)) could be
regarded as an acceptable ideal cipher. Indeed, the ideal cipher model does
not address this tiny difference between the two implementations: interpreting
the hashing result as a group element and not interpreting the hashing result
as a group element.
Indeed this instantiation without interpreting the hashing result as a group
element is completely insecure against partition attacks if the underlying group
is a subgroup of Z∗p or an elliptic curve group. The attack in Section 3.3 can
be used to show that for each randomly chosen r, log t bits information of
the password α is leaked. Thus after recording several communications with
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different r, the adversary can recover α.
3.5 Instantiation Eβ(X) by a cipher
The third ideal-cipher instantiation for AuthA in [3] is simply a cipher, e.g.,
Eβ(X) = AESβ(X). AuthA with this instantiation is not secure against par-
tition attacks if the underlying group is a subgroup of Z∗p or an elliptic curve
group. The insecurity of this instantiation has been observed by several au-
thors, see, e.g., [19,6].
Firstly we assume that the underlying group G is a subgroup of Z∗p. The
eavesdropper A tries to decrypt Eβ(g
x) and Eβ(g
y) with different guessed β ′
(= gα
′
). If either of the decrypted value E−1β′ (Eβ(g
x)) or E−1β′ (Eβ(g
y)) is not
an element of G, then A knows that α′ is not the correct password. Since
Eβ(X) is an ideal cipher, only with probability
(
||G||/2|p|
)2
both E−1β′ (Eβ(g
x))
and E−1β′ (Eβ(g
y)) are elements of G, where |p| and ||G|| denote the length of p
in binary representation and the cardinality of G respectively. Thus for each
execution of the protocol, 2 log(2|p|/||G||) bits information of the password α
is leaked. After recording several executions of the protocol, A recovers the
password.
Secondly assume that the underlying group G is an elliptic curve group. For an
elliptic curve group Ea,b(F
∗
p ) = 〈g〉 over the field F
∗
p , the element (x, y) ∈ 〈g〉
is denoted by its x and y coordinates. For a random chosen x ∈ F ∗p , the
probability that there exists a y ∈ F ∗p such that (x, y) is a point on the curve
is 1/2. Thus AuthA over elliptic curve groups with this instantiation is not
secure against partition attacks.
4 Security issues with ideal ciphers in one encryption key exchange
OEKE
Recently, Bresson, Chevassut, and Pointcheval [8] formally modeled the Au-
thA protocol by the One-Encryption-Key-Exchange (OEKE): only one flow
is encrypted (using either a symmetric-encryption primitive or a multiplica-
tive function as the product of a Diffie-Hellman value with a hash of the
password). The authors pointed out that the advantage of OEKE over the
classical EKE, wherein the two Diffie-Hellman values are encrypted, is its eas-
iness of integration. For example, in Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol
with password-based key-exchange cipher suits [21,22].
OEKE is similar to AuthA except that the first message is not encrypted. In
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particular, the protocol proceeds as follows:
(1) C chooses a random x ∈ [1, ord(g)− 1], computes gx and sends gx to the
Server S.
(2) S chooses a random y ∈ [1, ord(g)− 1], computes gy, encrypts it with β,
and sends the ciphertext Eβ(g
y) to C.
(3) C computes Auth = H1(C||S||g
x||gy||gxy), and sends Auth to S. C also
computes session key K = H0(C||S||g
x||gy||gxy).
(4) S verifies that the value Auth is correct and computes the session key
similarly.
Where H0 and H1 are two independent random oracles. The authors [8] show
that the protocol OEKE achieves provable security against dictionary attacks
in both the random oracle and ideal-cipher models under the computational
Diffie-Hellman intractability assumption. The authors [8] also observed that a
simple block-cipher could not be used for the instantiation of the ideal-cipher
due to the partition attacks.
The authors recommended two instantiations of the ideal cipher. In the first
method which is essentially from [1], one encrypts the element, and re-encrypts
the result, until one finally falls in the group G. The second instantiation is
the cipher Eβ(X) = X · H(β) that we have discussed in Section 3.3. That is
(see [8]), “to instantiate the encryption primitive as the product of a Diffie-
Hellman value with a hash of the password, as suggested in [3]”. Obviously,
if one dose not interpret the hashing output of password as a group element
before applying the multiplication, then our attacks in Section 3.3 work for
OEKE also. Thus we have the same concern for OEKE: the ideal cipher model
does not directly address the issues of interpreting the hashing output as
group elements. From the ideal cipher model viewpoints, the two instantiations
(one with interpretation of group elements and one without interpretation of
group elements) have no essential difference. However, one instantiation results
in broken protocol. This observation strengthens our viewpoint: without a
rigorous way to distinguish between secure and insecure instantiations of an
ideal-cipher, the value of the provable security in ideal-cipher model is limited.
5 Secure Remote Password protocol (SRP)
If the underlying group G in OEKE is indeed a finite field, then one can in-
stantiate the ideal-cipher with Eβ(X) = X + β and obtain the Secure Remote
Password protocol (SRP6) [25,26]. But one needs to be careful that SRP pro-
tocol uses different values for the keying material computation which achieves
stronger security. In the SRP6 protocol, the server S stores the value 〈C, β, s〉
for each client C, where β = gv, v = H(s||C||α), s is a random seed for C, and
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H is a predetermined hash function. Assume that the underlying group for
the protocol is G = Z∗p = 〈g〉. Then the protocol proceeds as follows:
(1) C sends his name C to the server S.
(2) S sends s to C.
(3) C chooses a random x ∈ [1, ord(g)− 1] and sends gx to S.
(4) S chooses a random y ∈ [1, ord(g)− 1] and sends 3β + gy to C.
(5) Let u = H(gx||3β + gy). C sends M = H(gx||3β + gy||S) to S where
S = gy(x+uv).
(6) S verifies that M is correct and sends H(gx||M ||S) to C.
(7) C verifies that H(gx||M ||S) is correct.
(8) Let K = H(S).
The role of u in SRP6 is to defeat an adversary A who may know β. If A
knows β and u is fixed, she can impersonate C by sending gx · g−vu = gx−uv
instead of gx in the third step. Then gy(x−uv+uv) = gxy, and K = H(gxy). Note
that this additional value u in the SRP protocol achieves stronger security
against stolen β while OEKE does not have this level of security.
If we instantiate the ideal cipher in OEKE with Eβ(X) = X · ı(H(β)) and use
the SRP6 shared secret computation method, then we get a natural general-
ization of the SRP protocol, where ı “appropriately” maps a random string
to a group element of order ord(g). For example, if we define ı(H(β)) by the
following procedure, then we get the SRP5 protocol [24] which is currently
under standardization in the IEEE 1363.2 standard working group.
(1) Let x = H(β).
(2) If x is a group element of order ord(g), then let ı(H(β)) = x. Otherwise,
increase x by one and go to step (2). Note that the sentence “increase x by
one” can be any natural interpretation of “add one to a group element”
in a group.
Since the original SRP protocol is based on a field and uses both field opera-
tions of addition and multiplication, there is no direct translation of SRP from
the group Z∗p to ECC-based groups. The above generalization SRP5 of SRP6
can be implemented over ECC groups.
Lee and Lee [14] have tried to design ECC-based SRP protocols and intro-
duced four ECC-based SRP protocols EC-SRP1, EC-SRP2, EC-SRP3, and
EC-SRP4. They used completely different key authentication steps (that is,
the steps (5) to (7) are different). The key steps in their protocols are the dif-
ferent instantiations of the ideal cipher. That is, they recommended replacing
the message 3β+ gy in the fourth step of the SRP protocol with the following
messages:
(1) gy for EC-SRP1.
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(2) gα · gxy for EC-SRP2.
(3) (gx−α)y for EC-SRP3.
(4) (gx−α+1)y for EC-SRP4.
The keying material K is the same as that in the original SRP protocol, i.e.,
K = SHA(gy(x+uv)). It is straightforward to check that the protocol EC-SRP1
is insecure against off-line dictionary attacks.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented several examples of real ciphers that would re-
sult in broken instantiations of the idealized AuthA and OEKE protocols.
Our results show that one should be extremely careful when designing or
implementing password-based protocols with provable security in idea-cipher
models: a provable security in ideal-cipher model does not necessarily say that
the instantiation of the protocol is secure.
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